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Abstract. Oliu-Barton and Ziliotto [8] proved that the constant payoff property holds for
discounted stochastic games, as conjectured by Sorin, Venel and Vigeral [11]. That is, the existence
of a pair of asymptotically optimal strategies so that the average rewards are constant on any
fraction of the game. That a similar property holds for stochastic games with an arbitrary evaluation
of the stage rewards is still open. In this paper, we prove that the constant constant payoff property
holds for a class of stochastic games which includes the well-known model of absorbing games and
stochastic games with two states.
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1 Introduction
Model. Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley [9] in order to model a repeated interaction
between two opponent players in a changing environment. The game proceeds in stages. At each
stage m ∈ N of the game, players play a zero-sum game that depends on a state variable. Formally,
knowing the current state km, Player 1 chooses an action im and Player 2 chooses an action
jm. Their choices occur independently and simultaneously and have two consequences: first, they
produce a stage payoff g(km, im, jm) which is observed by the players and, second, they determine
the law q(km, im, jm) of the next period’s state km+1. Thus, the sequence of states follows a Markov
chain controlled by the actions of both players. To any sequence of nonnegative weights θ = (θm)
and any initial state k corresponds the θ-weighted average stochastic game which is one in which
Player 1 maximizes the expectation of ∑
m≥1
θmg(km, im, jm)
given that k1 = k, while Player 2 minimizes this same amount. A crucial aspect in this model is that
the current state is commonly observed by the players at every stage. Another one is stationarity:
the transition function and stage payoff function do not change over time.
A θ-evaluated stochastic game is thus described by a tuple (K, I, J, g, q, k, θ) where K is a set
of states, I and J are the sets of actions of both players, g : K × I × J → R is the reward function,
q : K × I × J → ∆(K) is the transition function, k is the initial state and θ is a normalized
sequence of nonnegative weights, i.e. so that
∑
m≥1 θm = 1 with no loss of generality. A λ-
discounted stochastic game is one where θm = λ(1 − λ)
m−1 for all m ≥ 1 for some λ ∈ (0, 1].
A T -stage stochastic game is one where θm =
1
T
1{m≤T} for all m ≥ 1 for some T ∈ N. Like in
Shapley’s seminal paper [9], we assume throughout this paper that K, I, J are finite sets, and
identify the set K with {1, . . . , n}.
Selected past results. Every stochastic games (K, I, J, g, q, k, θ) has a value, denoted by vkθ .
Although only stated for the discounted case, this result follows from Shapley [9]. We use the
notation vkλ and v
k
T to refer respectively to the value of a λ-discounted and a T -stage stochastic
game. Bewley and Kohlberg [2] proved the convergence of vkλ as λ goes to 0 and the convergence
of vkT as T → +∞, to the same limit. Mertens and Neyman [5, 6] proved the existence of the value
vk, that is, Player 1 can ensure that the average reward is at least vk in any T -stage stochastic
game with T large enough, and similarly Player 2 can ensure that the average reward is at most
vk. Neyman and Sorin [7] studied stochastic games with a random number of stages, and proved
that the values converge to vk as the expected number of stages tends to +∞, and the expected
number of remaining stages decreases throughout the game. Ziliotto [13] proved that vkθ converges
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to vk as ‖θ‖ := maxm≥1 θm goes to 0 provided that
∑
m≥1 |θ
p
m+1 − θ
p
m| converges to zero for some
p > 0. The value was recently characterized by Attia and Oliu-Barton [1].
The constant-payoff property. A remarkable property, referred to as the constant-payoff prop-
erty was proved by Sorin, Venel and Vigeral [11] in the framework of single decision-maker problems,
and conjectured to hold in any stochastic game. Their conjecture goes as follows.
• The discounted case. For any sufficiently small λ there exists a pair of optimal strategy so
that
∑M
m=1 λ(1 − λ)
m−1g(km, im, jm) is approximatively equal to (
∑M
m=1 λ(1 − λ)
m−1)vk in
expectation.
• The general case. Because
∑
m≥1 λ(1 − λ)
m−1 = 1, Sorin [10] proposed the interpretation
of
∑M
m=1 λ(1 − λ)
m−1 as the fraction of the game that has been played at stage M . The
notion of a fraction of the game extends to any evaluation θ, and the general constant-
payoff conjecture is the existence of a pair of strategies so that for any sufficiently small ‖θ‖,∑M
m=1 θmg(km, im, jm) is approximatively equal to (
∑M
m=1 θm)v
k in expectation.
The constant-payoff conjecture was established Oliu-Barton and Ziliotto [8] for discounted stochas-
tic games, and the problem remains open for arbitrary evaluations of the rewards.
Main result. In this paper we solve the general constant-payoff conjecture for a class of stochastic
games (see Theorem 2.4 below) which includes the well-known model of absorbing games introduced
by Kohlberg[4], and stochastic games with two states. (It is worth noting that, for absorbing games,
the discounted constant-payoff property was proved by Sorin and Vigeral [12] using an independent
approach.)
2 Stochastic games
In the sequel, let (K, I, J, g, q, k, θ) denote a θ-evaluated stochastic game. In order to state our
results formally, we start by recalling some definitions.
2.1 Strategies
The sequence (k1, i1, j1, ..., km, im, jm, ...) generated along the game is called a play. The set of
plays is (K × I × J)N.
Definition 2.1
• A strategy for a player specifies a mixed action to each possible set of past observations.
Formally, a strategy for Player 1 is a collection of maps σ1 = (σ1)m≥1, where σ
1
m : (K × I ×
3
J)m−1 ×K → ∆(I). Similarly, a strategy for Player 2 is a collection of maps σ2 = (σ2)m≥1,
where σ2m : (K × I × J)
m−1 ×K → ∆(J).
• A stationary strategy is one that plays according to the current state only. Formally, a
stationary strategy for Player 1 is a mapping x : K → ∆(I), and a stationary strategy for
Player 2 is a mapping y : K → ∆(J).
Notation. The sets of strategies for Player 1 and 2 are denoted by Σ and T , respectively, and the
sets of stationary strategies by ∆(I)n and ∆(J)n. For any pair (σ, τ) ∈ Σ × T we denote by Pkσ,τ
the unique probability measure on the set of plays (K × I × J)N induced by (σ, τ), k1 = k and q.
(Note that the dependence on the transition function q is omitted). This probability is well-defined
by the Kolmogorov extension theorem, and the expectation with respect to the probability Pkσ,τ is
denoted by Ekσ,τ .
2.2 The cumulated payoffs
For each normalized sequence of nonnegative weights θ we introduce the clock function ϕ(θ, · ) :
[0, 1] → N by setting
ϕ(θ, t) := inf{M ≥ 1,
∑M
m=1
θm ≥ t} ∀t ∈ [0, 1] .
The cumulated payoff at time t is defined for any pair of strategies (σ, τ) ∈ Σ× T as
γkθ (σ, τ ; t) := E
k
σ,τ
[∑ϕ(θ,t)
m=1
θmg(km, im, jm)
]
.
Note that the case t = 1 corresponds to the expectation of the θ-evaluation of the stage rewards.
2.3 Optimal and asymptotically optimal strategies
Definition 2.2 An optimal strategy of Player 1 is an element σ ∈ Σ so that, for all τ ∈ T ,
γkθ (σ, τ ; t) ≥ v
k
θ .
An optimal strategies of Player 2 is defined in a similar way. That is, it is an element τ ∈ Σ so
that, for all σ ∈ Σ one has γkθ (σ, τ ; t) ≤ v
k
θ .
Definition 2.3 Let ε ≥ 0. A family of strategies (σεθ) indexed by θ is asymptotically ε-optimal for
Player 1 if for any τ ∈ T ,
lim inf
λ→0
γkλ(x
ε
λ, τ) ≥ v
k − ε .
Asymptotically ε-optimal for Player 2 are defined in a symmetric way.
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2.4 The general constant payoff conjecture
Sorin, Venel and Vigeral [11] conjectured the existence of a pair of asymptotically 0-optimal
strategies (σ(θ), τ(θ)), indexed by θ, and so that
lim
‖θ‖→0
γkθ (σ(θ), τ(θ); t) = tv
k ∀t ∈ [0, 1] .
A family of asymptotically 0-optimal strategies. Let (xλ, yλ) a fixed family of optimal
stationary strategies so that λ 7→ xkλ(i) and λ 7→ y
k
λ admit a Puiseux expansion near 0 for all
(i, j) ∈ I × J . For each θ ∈ ∆(N) and m ≥ 1 set
λm =
θm∑
m′≥m θm′
.
Define then the strategy pair (σθ, τ θ) by setting,
(σθm, τ
θ
m) := (xλθm , yλθm) ∀m ≥ 1 . (2.1)
The family (σθ, τ θ) is asymptotically 0-optimal by Ziliotto [13], so it is a good candidate for tackling
the general constant-payoff conjecture.
2.5 Main result
Consider the following symmetric conditions (H1) and (H2). These conditions preclude going from
one state to another and back, and then to a third state, for a fixed pure stationary strategy of the
opponent.
• (H1) There does not exist a triplet of different states (ℓ, ℓ′, ℓ) and a tuple of actions
(i, i, j, i′, j′), i 6= i so that
q(ℓ′ | ℓ, i, j)q(ℓ | ℓ′ , i′, j′)q(ℓ | ℓ, i, j) > 0 .
• (H2) There does not exist a triplet of different states (ℓ, ℓ′, ℓ) and a tuple of and a tuple of
actions (i, i′, j, j, j′), j 6= j so that
q(ℓ′ | ℓ, i, j)q(ℓ | ℓ′ , i′, j′)q(ℓ | ℓ, i, j) > 0 .
Theorem 2.4 Any stochastic game (K, I, J, g, q, k, θ) satisfying (H1) and (H2) satisfies general
constant-payoff property. More precisely, the family of asymptotically 0-optimal strategies defined
in (2.1) satisfies
lim
‖θ‖→0
γkθ (σ
θ, τ θ; t) = tvk ∀t ∈ [0, 1] .
Definition 2.5 A stochastic game (K, I, J, g, q, k, θ) is absorbing if for every state ℓ 6= k is ab-
sorbing, i.e. q(ℓ | ℓ, i, j) = 1 for all (i, j) ∈ I × J .
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The following result is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.4.
Corollary 2.6 Suppose that (K, I, J, g, q, k, θ) is an absorbing game. Then,
lim
‖θ‖→0
γkθ (σ
θ, τ θ; t) = tvk ∀t ∈ [0, 1] .
3 Proofs
Theorem 2.4 relies on the two following properties, which hold for all t ∈ [0, 1]:
• limλ→0 γ
k
λ(xλ, yλ; t) = tv
k.
• lim‖θ‖→0 γ
k
θ (σ
θ, τ θ; t) exists and does not depend on the family of vanishing evaluations.
We start by recalling some useful results from [3, 8] on discounted stochastic games. Then, for
the sake of simplicity, we will establish Corollary 2.6 firs. Finally, we will extend this result to the
class of stochastic games of Theorem 2.4.
3.1 Preliminaries
We recall the following results from [3, 8] for discounted stochastic games.
Theorem 3.1 For every t ∈ [0, 1] the limit Πt := limλ→0
∑
m≥1 λ(1− λ)
m−1Qm−1λ ∈ R
n×n exists.
Furthermore, there exist p ∈ N, which stands for the number of payoff-relevant cycles, Φ ∈ Rn×p,
A ∈ Rp×p and M ∈ Rp×n so that
Πt =
∫ t
0
Φe− ln(1−s)AMds .
Corollary 3.2 The map t 7→ Πt is twice differentiable on (0, 1) and
∂2
∂t2
Πt =
1
1− t
Φe− ln(1−t)AAM ∀t ∈ (0, 1) .
Lemma 3.3 Suppose that AMg0 = 0. Then, limλ→0 γλ(xλ, yλ; t) = tv.
Indeed, in this case one has ∂
2
∂t2
Πtg0 = 0. Therefore, there exists vectors α, β ∈ R
n so that
Πtg0 = αt+ β. The boundedness of g0 implies that
lim
λ→0
γλ(xλ, yλ; t) = Πtg0 ∀t ∈ [0, 1] .
In particular one has Π0g0 = 0 because Π0 = 0 by definition, and Π1g0 = v by the optimality of
(xλ, yλ). Consequently, α = v and β = 0.
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3.2 Absorbing games
Throughout this section, (K, I, J, g, q, k, θ) is an absorbing game, where all states except k are
absorbing. For any initial state ℓ 6= k, the stochastic game (K, I, J, g, q, ℓ, θ) is equivalent to the
matrix game gℓ ∈ RI×J so that vℓθ = v
ℓ = val gℓ. For this reason, we restrict our attention to the
game with initial state k.
3.3 The constant payoff in discounted absorbing games
Proposition 3.1 Let (xλ, yλ) be a pair of optimal strategies that admit an expansion in Puiseux
series near 0. Then, for all t ∈ [0, 1], limλ→0 γ
k
λ(xλ, yλ; t) = tv
k
Let p ∈ N, A ∈ Rp×p and M ∈ Rp×n be as in Theorem 3.1. By Lemma 3.3 it is enough to prove
that AMg0 = 0. First of all, note that any absorbing state ℓ 6= k is payoff relevant cycle, and that
Aℓ,ℓ = 0 because Aℓ,ℓ is the the normalized exit rate from ℓ. We distinguish two cases, depending
on whether k is a payoff-relevant cycle or not.
Case 1: k is not a payoff-relevant cycle. In this case p = n− 1 and A = 0, so that AMg0 = 0.
Case 2: k is a payoff-relevant cycle. In this case p = n and M = Id so it is enough to prove
Ag0 = 0. If A
k,k = 0, then again A = 0 so that Ag0 = 0. So suppose that |A
k,k| > 0. This is the
interesting case, as it corresponds to a situation where the absorption occurs after a positive, but
random fraction of the game. We now prove this case.
Proof. For all (i, j) ∈ I × J , let (c(i), e(i), c′(j), e′(j)) ∈ R4+ so that x
k
λ(i) = c(i)λ
e(i) + o(λe(i))
and ykλ(j) = c
′(j)λe
′(j) + o(λe
′(j)), and so that c = 0 implies e = 0. Introduce the sets of actions:
I0 = {i ∈ I | e(i) = 0}
I∗ = {i ∈ I | e(i) ∈ (0, 1)}
I1 = {i ∈ I | e(i) = 1}
I+ = {i ∈ I | e(i) > 1} .

J0 = {j ∈ J | e
′(j) = 0}
J∗ = {j ∈ J | e
′(j) ∈ (0, 1)}
J1 = {j ∈ J | e
′(j) = 1}
J+ = {j ∈ J | e
′(j) > 1} .
The sets I0, I∗, I1, I+ partition I while J0, J∗, J1, J+ partition J . Because k is a payoff-relevant cycle
and |Ak,k| > 0, the normalized exit rate from k to any other state ℓ 6= k is given by Ak,ℓ, which is
the sum of the three normalized exit rates corresponding to I0×J1, the pairs (i, j) ∈ I∗×J∗ so that
e(i)+e′(j) = 1, and I1×J0, denoted respectively by A
k,ℓ
10 , A
k,ℓ
∗ , and A
k,ℓ
01 . Thus, A = A10+A∗+A01,
where these are four n× n Markov matrices. The situation can be visualized as follows.
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J+J1J∗J0
I+
I1
I∗
I0 gk0
A10
A∗
A01
The actions in I0 × J0 determine the payoff g
k
0 , while the shaded areas correspond to the pairs of
actions which determine the transitions from k to the set of absorbing states. The actions in I+
and J+ are irrelevant as they do not affect neitherg
k
0 nor A
k,ℓ for all ℓ 6= k.
Case 2a: Suppose by contradiction that gk0 > v
k and |Ak,k01 | > 0. In this case, Player 2 can deviate
from yλ to a strategy y˜λ which changes the probabilities of playing actions in J1 to c
′(j)λ1−ε for a
sufficiently small ε (say, smaller than all nonzero e(i) and e′(j)). By doing so, the probability that
the state k is left before stage t/λ goes to 1 for any t > 0. Consequently,
lim
λ→0
γkλ(xλ, y˜λ) =
∑
ℓ 6=k
Ak,ℓvℓ
|Ak,k|
. (3.1)
On the other hand, if Player 1 deviates from xλ to a strategy x˜λ which plays actions outside I0 to
0, then the transition from k to the set of absorbing states depends only on A01, and one has
lim
λ→0
γkλ(x˜λ, yλ) =
g0 +
∑
ℓ 6=k A
k,ℓ
01 v
ℓ
1 + |Ak,k|01
. (3.2)
Yet, the optimality of (xλ) and (yλ) implies that
lim
λ→0
γkλ(x˜λ, yλ) ≤ v ≤ lim
λ→0
γkλ(xλ, y˜λ) . (3.3)
The relations (3.4), (3.2) and (3.3) are not compatible with gk0 > v
k, a contradiction. Case 2b:
Suppose by contradiction that gk0 > v
k and Ak,k01 = 0. In this case, for the strategy (x˜λ) described
in the previous case, one has
lim
λ→0
γkλ(x˜λ, yλ) = g
k
0 .
This contradicts the optimality of (yλ).
We thus conclude that gk0 ≤ v
k. Similarly, reversing the roles of the players one obtains gk0 ≥ v
k
so that gk0 = v
k. Now one the one hand, gℓ = vℓ for all ℓ 6= k and on the other Aℓ,ℓ
′
= 0 for all
ℓ 6= k and ℓ′. Therefore, Ag = Av = 0 as soon as Ak,kvk +
∑
ℓ 6=kA
k,ℓvℓ = 0, which follows from
vk = lim
λ→0
γkλ(xλ, yλ) =
gk0 +
∑
ℓ 6=kA
k,ℓvℓ
1 + |Ak,k|
. (3.4)
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3.4 The constant payoff for general absorbing games
Proposition 3.2 Let (σθ, τ θ) be the family of asymptotically 0-optimal strategies defined in (2.1).
Then, for all t ∈ [0, 1], lim‖θ‖→0 γ
k
θ (σ
θ, τ θ; t) exists and does not depend on the vanishing evalua-
tions.
We start by two technical lemmas.
Lemma 3.4 Let 0 ≤ t < t+ h < 1. Then, for all e ≥ 0,
lim
‖θ‖→0
ϕ(t+h,θ)∑
m=ϕ(t,θ)
(λθm)
e =

+∞ if e < 1
ln
(
1− h1−t
)
if e = 1
0 if e > 1 .
Proof. For each m ≥ 1 set tθm :=
∑m−1
m′=1 θm so that λ
θ
m =
θm+1
1−tθm
. Then, for any m between ϕ(t, θ)
and ϕ(t+ h, θ) one has t ≤ tθm ≤ t+ h, so that(
θm+1
1− t
)e
≤
(
θm+1
1− tθm
)e
≤
(
θm+1
1− t− h
)e
(3.5)
We distinguish three cases, depending on whether e = 1, e > 1 or e < 1.
Case e = 1. It is enough to note that lim‖θ‖→0
∑ϕ(t+h,θ)
m=ϕ(t,θ) θm+1 = h, add the inequalities of (3.5)
for all ϕ(θ, t) ≤ m ≤ ϕ(θ, t+ h) and then take ‖θ‖ to 0, to obtain the desired result, i.e.
h
1− t
≤ lim
‖θ‖→0
ϕ(t+h,θ)∑
m=ϕ(t,θ)
λθm ≤
h
1− t− h
It follows that, as h tends to 0, lim‖θ‖→0
∑ϕ(t+h,θ)
m=ϕ(t,θ) λ
θ
m =
h
1− t
+ o(h), and hence the result.
Case e < 1. In this case θem+1 ≥ ‖θ‖
e−1θm+1. From (3.5) one derives
ϕ(t+h,θ)∑
m=ϕ(t,θ)
(λθm)
e ≥ ‖θ‖e−1
ϕ(t+h,θ)∑
m=ϕ(t,θ)
θm+1 . (3.6)
The result follows, since lim‖θ‖→0 ‖θ‖
e−1 = +∞ and lim‖θ‖→0
∑ϕ(t+h,θ)
m=ϕ(t,θ) θm+1 = h.
Case e > 1. In this case θem+1 ≤ ‖θ‖
e−1θm+1, and the result follows from (3.5) like the previous
case, since lim‖θ‖→0 ‖θ‖
e−1 = 0 in this case.
Lemma 3.5 Let (aθm)m≥1 be a sequence in [0, 1] and let f( · , θ) : [0, 1] → N be a nondecreasing
mao so that lim‖θ‖→0
∑f(t,θ)
m=1 θm = t. Suppose that lim‖θ‖→0 |a
θ
f(t,θ) − a(t)| = 0 for all t ∈ [0, 1] and
some measurable function a : [0, 1] → [0, 1]. Then,
lim
‖θ‖→0
f(t,θ)∑
m=1
θma
θ
m =
∫ t
0
a(s)ds .
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The proof of this result is omitted.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. For each m ≥ 1, let Qθm ∈ R
n×n be the transition matrix induced
by (σθ, τ θ) at stage m. By the definition of these strategies, there exist coefficients cℓ ≥ 0 and
exponents eℓ ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n so that
(Qθm)
k,ℓ =
{
cℓ(λ
θ
m)
eℓ + o((λθm)
eℓ) if ℓ 6= k
1− ck(λ
θ
m)
ek + o((λθm)
ek) if ℓ = k .
Moreover one can assume without loss of generality that eℓ = 0 whenever cℓ = 0 for all ℓ 6= k, so
that ek ≥ eℓ for all ℓ 6= k. Let p(t, θ) be the probability of being at k after ϕ(t, θ) stages. Then
p(t, θ) =
ϕ(t,θ)∏
m=1
(Qθm)
k,k =
ϕ(t,θ)∏
m=1
(
1− ck(λ
θ
m)
ek + o((λθm)
ek)
)
.
Taking ‖θ‖ to 0 and setting p(t) := lim‖θ‖→0 p(t, θ) one has, by Lemma 3.4,
pt = lim
‖θ‖→0
exp
−ck ϕ(t,θ)∑
m=1
(λθm)
ek
 =

0 if ek < 1
(1− t)c if ek = 1
1 if ek > 1 .
In other words, pt is well-defined and does not depend on the family of vanishing evaluations.
Similarly, conditional on reaching an absorbing at stage m + 1, the probability that km+1 = ℓ is
given by
P
k
σθ,τθ
(km+1 = ℓ | km = k) =
(Qθm)
k,ℓ∑
ℓ′ 6=k(Q
θ
m)
k,ℓ′
=
cℓ(λ
θ
m)
eℓ + o((λθm)
eℓ)
ck(λθm)
ek + o((λθm)
ek)
.
Thus, the limits as ‖θ‖ goes to 0 exist for all ℓ 6= k, and do not depend on the family of vanishing
evaluations. Let aℓ :=
cℓ
ck
1{eℓ=ek} denote this limit. Together, these two results imply that for all
t ∈ [0, 1] the following limit exists and does not depend on the family of vanishing evaluations:
P k,ℓt := lim
‖θ‖→0
P
k
σθ ,τθ
(
kϕ(θ,t) = ℓ
)
= pt1{ℓ=k} + (1− pt)aℓ1{ℓ 6=k} ∀1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n .
Hence, the same is true for the cumulated times Πk,ℓt :=
∫ t
0 P
k,ℓ
s ds. Finally, lim‖θ‖→0 g(σ
θ , τ θ) = g0
exists and does not depend on the family of vanishing evaluations either. The result follows then
from Lemma 3.5, since it implies in particular that Πt = lim‖θ‖→0
∑ϕ(θ,t)
m=1 θm
∏m
m′=1Q
θ
m′ , so that
lim
λ→0
γθ(xλ, yλ; t) = Πtg0 .

3.5 Critical stochastic games
In this section we extend the constant-payoff property to any critical stochastic game, a class that
includes stochastic games satisfying (H1) and (H2).
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A critical stochastic game is one with the the following property. For each ε > 0 there exists a
family of strategies (xελ, y
ε
λ) in the discounted stochastic game which satisfies
• (xελ) is asymptotically ε-optimal for Player 1 and (y
ε
λ) is asymptotically ε-optimal strategy
for Player 2, that is for any (σ, τ) ∈ Σ× T ,
lim inf
λ→0
γkλ(x
ε
λ, τ) ≥ v
k − ε and lim sup
λ→0
γkλ(σ, y
ε
λ) ≤ v
k + ε .
• The stochastic matrix (Qελ) on the state space induced by (x
ε
λ, y
ε
ε) is critical, that is, there
exists a transition matrix M ∈ Rn×n (of a continuous-time Markov chain, so that for all
1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n, M ℓ,ℓ
′
≥ 0 for all ℓ′ 6= ℓ, and M ℓ,ℓ +
∑
ℓ′ 6=ℓM
ℓ,ℓ′ = 0) so that
Qελ = Id+Mλ+ o(λ) .
Proposition 3.3 Every stochastic games satisfying the assumptions (H1) and (H2) is critical.
Proof. Let (xλ) be a family of optimal stationary strategies so that λ 7→ x
k
λ(i) admit a Puiseux
expansion near 0 for all (k, i) ∈ K × I and let c(k, i) and e(k, i) so that xkλ(i) = c(k, i)λ
e(k,i) +
o(λe(k,i)). For any T ∈ N and λ consider the strategy xTλ of Player 1 defined by (x
T
λ )
k(i) := 0 if
e(k, i) > 0 and otherwise
(xTλ )
k(i) :=
c(k, i)T 1−e(k,i)λ∑
i′∈I c(k, i
′)T 1−e(k,i′)λ1e(k,i)≤1
.
One defines a strategy yTλ of Player 2 in a symmetric way. The family of Markov chains (Q
T
λ ) is
critical by construction, so it is enough to prove that the strategies (xTλ ) and (y
T
λ ) are asymptotically
ε-optimal for T large enough or, equivalently, that for any j ∈ Jn,
lim
T→+∞
lim
λ→0
γλ(x
T
λ , j) = lim
λ→0
γλ(xλ, j) = v ∈ R
n .
This result follows from the fact that (H1) implies that the limλ→0 γλ(xλ, j) depends only on the
exist terms of highest order for each state, so that the loss of (xTλ ) is bounded by the difference
between the exit distributions, which tends to 0. Similarly, (H2) implies an analogue property for
(yTλ ).
In the sequel, let (xλ, yλ) a fixed family of optimal stationary strategies so that λ 7→ x
k
λ(i) and
λ 7→ ykλ admit a Puiseux expansion near 0 for all (i, j) ∈ I × J , and let (Qλ) be the corresponding
family of stochastic matrices. We assume that (Qλ) is critical. Let (σ
θ, τ θ) be the pair of
strategies indexed by θ defined in Section 2.5, and for each m ≥ 1 let Qθm ∈ R
n×n be the transition
matrix induced by (σθ, τ θ) at stage m. By the choice of (xλ, yλ) for each 1 ≤ ℓ, ℓ
′ ≤ n and m ≥ 1,
there exist c(ℓ, ℓ′) ≥ 0 and e(ℓ, ℓ′) ≥ 0 so that
Qθm(ℓ, ℓ
′) = c(ℓ, ℓ′)(λθm)
e(ℓ,ℓ′) .
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A family of continuous-time processes indexed by θ. First of all, the family (Qλ) being
critical, every state is a payoff-relevant cycle. Fix an initial state 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Let (Y k,θm )m≥1 be the
random process of states (km) under the law P
k
σθ,τθ
, which is a inhomogeneous Markov chain with
transition matrices (Qθm). For any t, h ≥ 0 so that 0 ≤ t ≤ t+ h ≤ 1, let J
θ
[t,t+h] be the number of
jumps (i.e. changes of state) of the process (Y k,θm )m≥1 in the interval [ϕ(t, θ), ϕ(t + h, θ)]. Finally,
let (Xk,θt ) be the time-changed process defined on [0, 1] by
Xk,θt := Y
k,θ
ϕ(t,θ)
∀t ∈ [0, 1] .
Notation. In the sequel, we will use the following notation.
• For any t, h ≥ 0 so that 0 ≤ t ≤ t+ h ≤ 1 define
P θt,t+h :=
ϕ(t+h,θ)∏
m=ϕ(t,θ)
Qθm .
• For all t ∈ [0, 1] and 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n, let Pℓt denote the conditional probability on {X
k,θ
t = ℓ}, so
that for all 1 ≤ ℓ, ℓ′ ≤ n and 0 ≤ t ≤ t+ h ≤ 1,
P
ℓ
t(X
k,θ
t+h = ℓ
′) := P(Xk,θt+h = ℓ
′ |Xk,θt = ℓ) = (P
θ
t,t+h)
ℓ,ℓ′
Proposition 3.4 Let (Qλ)λ be so that Qλ = Id+Aλ + o(λ) for a transition matrix A ∈∈ R
n×n.
Then, for all t ∈ [0, 1),
(i) lim‖θ‖→0 P
ℓ
t(X
k,θ
t+h = ℓ) = 1 +
Aℓ,ℓ
1− t
h+ o(h).
(ii) lim‖θ‖→0 P
ℓ
t(X
k,θ
t+h = ℓ
′) =
Aℓ,ℓ
′
1− t
h+ o(h).
Proof. (i) Conditional to {Xk,θt = ℓ}, the event {X
k,θ
t+h = ℓ} is the disjoint union of {J
θ
[t,t+h] = 0}
and {Xk,θt+h = ℓ} ∩ {J
θ
[t,t+h] ≥ 2}. For the former, one has
lim
‖θ‖→0
P
ℓ
t(J
θ
[t,t+h] = 0) = 1 +
Aℓ,ℓ
1− t
h+ o(h) . (3.7)
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Indeed,
lim
‖θ‖→0
P
ℓ
t(J
θ
[t,t+h] = 0) = lim
‖θ‖→0
ϕ(t+h,θ)∏
m=ϕ(t,θ)
P
ℓ
t(X
k,θ
m+1 = X
k,θ
m ),
= lim
‖θ‖→0
ϕ(t+h,θ)∏
m=ϕ(t,θ)
1−∑
s′ 6=ℓ
(Qθm)
ℓ,ℓ′
 ,
= lim
‖θ‖→0
ϕ(t+h,θ)∏
m=ϕ(t,θ)
(
1− λθm|A
ℓ,ℓ|+ o(λθm)
)
,
= lim
‖θ‖→0
exp
−|Aℓ,ℓ| ϕ(t+h,θ)∑
m=ϕ(t,θ)
λθm
 ,
and the result follows from Lemma 3.4. For the latter, namely {Xk,θt+h = ℓ}∩{J
θ
[t,t+h] ≥ 2}, one has
P
ℓ
t(J
θ
[t,t+h] ≥ 2) ≤ max
1≤ℓ′≤n
P
t
ℓ′(J
θ
[0,h] ≥ 1)
2 = max
1≤ℓ′≤n
(
1− Ptℓ′(J
θ
[t,t+h] = 0)
)2
. (3.8)
Therefore, lim‖θ‖→0 P
ℓ
t(J
θ
[t,t+h] ≥ 2) = o(h), which together with (3.7) proves the desired result.
(ii) Similarly, conditional on {Xk,θt = ℓ},
{Xk,θt+h = ℓ
′} = {Xst+h = ℓ
′} ∩
(
{Jθ[t,t+h] = 1} ∪ {J
θ
[t,t+h] ≥ 2}
)
.
Together with (3.8) this equality yields
lim
‖θ‖→0
P
ℓ
t(X
k,θ
t+h = ℓ
′) = lim
‖θ‖→0
P
ℓ
t(J
θ
[t,t+h] = 1, X
k,θ
t+h = ℓ
′) + o(h) .
Conditional on leaving the state ℓ at stage m, the probability of going to ℓ′ 6= ℓ is given by
P(Xk,θm+1 = ℓ
′ |Xk,θm = ℓ,X
k,θ
m+1 6= ℓ) =
(Qθm)
ℓ,ℓ′∑
ℓ′′ 6=ℓ(Q
θ
m)
ℓ,ℓ′′
.
By assumption, this converges to A
ℓ,ℓ′
|Aℓ,ℓ|
as ‖θ‖ goes to 0. On the other hand, (3.8) implies
lim
‖θ‖→0
P
ℓ
t(J
θ
[t,t+h] = 1) = lim
‖θ‖→0
1− Pℓt(J
θ
[t,t+h] = 0) + o(h) .
Consequently, one has
lim
‖θ‖→0
P
ℓ
t(J
θ
[t,t+h] = 1, X
k,θ
t+h = ℓ
′) = lim
‖θ‖→0
(Qθm)
ℓ,ℓ′∑
ℓ′′ 6=ℓ(Q
θ
m)
ℓ,ℓ′′
(
1− Pℓt(J
θ
[t,t+h] = 0) + o(h)
)
=
Aℓ,ℓ
′
|Aℓ,ℓ|
(
|Aℓ,ℓ|
1− t
h+ o(h)
)
=
Aℓ,ℓ
′
1− t
h+ o(h),
where we used (3.7) to deduce the second equality.
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Corollary 3.6 The processes (Xk,θt )t∈[0,1] converge, as θ tends to 0, to a inhomogeneous Markov
process with generators
(
1
1−tA
)
t∈[0,1]
.
Proof. The limit is identified by Proposition 3.4. The tightness is a consequence of (ii). Indeed,
it implies that for any T > 0, uniformly in θ:
lim
ε→0
P
(
∃t1, t2 ∈ [0, T ] | t1 < t2 < t1 + ε, X
k,θ
t−
1
6= Xk,θt1 , X
k,θ
t−
2
6= Xk,θt2
)
= 0,
which is precisely the tightness criterion for càdlàg process with discrete values.
Corollary 3.7 For all t ∈ [0, 1] the following limit exist:
Πt := lim
‖θ‖→0
ϕ(θ,t)∑
m=1
θm
m∏
m′=1
Qθm′ =
∫ t
0
e− ln(1−s)Ads .
Corollary 3.7 follows from Corollary 3.6 together with Lemma 3.5.
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